Taiwan and China take yet another step towards economic integration

A short snippet taken from April's edition of Monocle magazine.

"China and Taiwan might be diplomatic adversaries but their economies have never been more tightly intertwined.  Businesses and investors on both sides of the strait can now exchange Chinese renminbi and Taiwanese dollars without having to convert to US dollars first. It's part of a gradual warming of economic ties with China that Taiwan's president, Ma Ying-jeou, has pursued since taking office in 2008.  Taipei's hope is that it will become a regional financial centre; the more likely scenario is that Taiwan adds to renminbi trading, raising the Chinese currency's profile overseas (emph. added), says Frances Cheung, senior markets analyst at Credit Agricole CIB in Hong Kong."

Unfortunately, Mr. Cheung is probably right with his analysis.  Until Taiwan makes the difficult decision to deregulate its banking and energy sectors, moves such as the one described above will simply enhance the international perception that  Taiwan is moving ever closer towards near-total  economic dependency on China.  

The Yasukuni Complex

         The Yasukuni Shrine in Japan reopens old wounds on a near-annual basis for many nationalities in Asia.  

     On August 9th, The People's Daily Online, an officially sanctioned media outlet of the Chinese Communist Party, published an editorial entitled "Time to put an end to Japanese 'ghost worship', in which it stated that "every year on August 15th, a historical scar is reopened by the refusal of Japanese politicians to face up to their history of aggression-- a refusal that is encapsulated in their "ghost worship".  It is a unique event in the fact that for at least one day out of the year, China shares a common historical bond with North and South Korea, as well as Taiwan in their opposition of Japanese leaders visiting the shrine to pay their respects to who they see as those who have defended Japan throughout history.  It's not difficult to see the sensitivity surrounding the issue. A number of  convicted war criminals have been enshrined into the complex, including Hideki Tojo and Kenji Doihara, which is the primary source of anger among many who  feel that these individuals are unjustly  honored, which also results in a collective  revision of historical events within Japanese society.  While these bones of contentment are understandable, Japan is not alone in having a difficult time facing their historical wartime demons. 

     Whenever a state is involved in conflict in  either an external or domestic nature,  there are individuals and events that the opposition will undoubtedly see in a negative light.  In the United States, the sensitive nature of the Civil War that took place over 150 years ago still rears its ugly head via flag controversies, memorials, and burials among Americans in a way that oftentimes would give the impression that the conflict took place much more recently.  It is often difficult for a society to admit that over the course of a particular conflict,  some within their tribe committed acts that went beyond the scope of a defense of their respective nation and its ideals,  and more into the realm of unacceptable human behavior--The acts of a few can shame the collective conscience of a nation.  Shame is not a feeling that any society would enjoy having for any period of time, but it can be a necessary cross that needs to be carried for a time in order for a  society to  move on from a particular conflict, and to  regain a pride that has been damaged.  Some countries have been able to bear this burden well and come to grips with violent episodes in their recent history (post-Nazi Germany, Cambodia,  Peru), while some are still struggling ( South Africa, Turkey).  

Japan is a unique case in that it has shown  a willingness to accept responsibility for its role in the Second World War by adopting and maintaining a Constitution that is a drastically different governmental framework that it had prior to 1945, and is based on democratic values and a pacifist--defense oriented military (although the military aspect within the constitution  could change in the near future).  It also has sectors within its society that has shown a steadfast reluctance to accept the documented episodes of Japanese brutality that took place throughout many of its conquered territories over the course of the Second World War, either by glossing over history in its school textbooks, and for many, the annual visits by members of the Japanese government to the Yasukuni Shrine. 

Ironically, three of the countries who often are most vocally opposed to the Yasukuni Shrine visits still have a "Yasukuni Complex" themselves in varying degrees.  The People's Daily editorial also stated that "Every time this date approaches, right-wing Japanese politicians parade their distorted view of war and history" and that the words from some Japanese officials "are shameless and aggressive" that "disdain the impact they have on the sensitivities of other peoples".  While there is not an official date that members of the Chinese Communist Party Standing Committee collectively get together to mark an official day of respect for those who they see as "heroes", the PRC does have what some could consider a building that is insensitive in its own right. 

Mao Zedong: The Chinese leader whose economic and political policies are  responsible for an estimated 20-70 million deaths. While the CCP criticizes Japanese "Ghost Worship", it practices its own version of honoring a controversial leader--in the flesh.  

While in recent decades, following Mao's death in 1976, the government has admitted "mistakes" were made over the course of Mao's rule, China has yet to come to terms with its own dark periods in contemporary history.  In the case of North Korea, it is not even worth exploring its own version of the "Yasukuni Complex", as it is a necessary component for the legitimization of the Korean Workers Party within the DPRK, and will remain so for the foreseeable future. 

In Taiwan, there has been considerable progress towards recognizing and coming to grips with  the brutal period of Chaing Kai-Shek's Kuomintang one-party rule for nearly 40 years on Taiwan, although there are still many people who have never been unaccounted for, and some within the KMT apparatus have attempted to gloss over the atrocities that took place within Taiwanese society  during this time as "necessary evils" in order to combat the communist threat from China proper.  

It is undoubtedly difficult to say "I'm sorry" as an individual. To do so on a collective level is perhaps even more difficult in that there are varying levels of emotion that must be grouped and packaged into a consensus that can be accepted by a society: guilt, responsibility, acceptance, pride, forgiveness, and surely many more.  The process can only begin by a willingness to take on these emotions, and in many cases certain societies do not yet have the collective will that is necessary to carry out this difficult task. In the case of Japan, perhaps it is time for it to do so, and in this modern age of mass media and social networking, the citizens of China, Taiwan,and even eventually North Korea could take note, and begin the process of  reflection themselves---and shedding their own "Yasukuni Complex" in the process. 

                                         

China Proposes Cross-Strait Highways to link China and Taiwan...Doesn't Ask for Taiwan's Approval

While Taiwan remains engulfed in its own domestic problems regarding the musical chairs being played over finding a new Defense Minister, the powers that be in Beijing continue to draw up lofty projects that are intended to draw Taiwan further into the PRC orbit.

On Monday,  the South China Morning Post reported that the Chinese government approved a national road project that includes the construction of two cross-Strait highways that would link the Chinese cities of Fuzhou and Xiamen with the Taiwanese cities of Taipei and Kaohsiung respectively. While members of the Chinese political elite have long been known to clamor over grand infrastructure projects, there was a small problem with this one in particular in that Beijing didn't ask Taiwan about its interest in such a project. A member of Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council stated that "Based on national security concerns and cross-Strait interactions, we have not planned anything with such high political sensitivity and complexity,".

Looking at the official Chinese State media illustrations regarding such a project, it is not difficult to see why there would be a high level of opposition from those in Taiwan who are leery of the island being drawn uncomfortably closer under such a plan.

Looking to place  the shackles on Taiwan via tunnels and highways? 

While such a project remains merely a dream for China for the foreseeable future, it is not without supporters on at least a smaller scale from some within Taiwan.  The SCMP also stated in its report that The government of Quemoy "first proposed building the bridge in 2006, in a bid to increase tourism and economic exchanges with the mainland", and also stated that President Ma "voiced support for the bridge three months after becoming President in 2008..." but he later backtracked from supporting the project due to criticism from the "pro-independence camp".

China has also looked to increase joint development projects with Taiwan in other areas within the Taiwan Strait in recent years. In 2012, the PRC proposed a joint development project  with Taiwan on the Chinese-controlled island of Pingtan, in which Taiwanese citizens would essentially share posts with Chinese on the management committee in the management of the island.  (President Ma, however, was not receptive of the idea).  

While only a little over  five years have passed since Ma Ying-jeou began his term as President of Taiwan, which resulted in the warming of ties between Taiwan and China, it appears that the PRC will look to continue in its attempt to reach for higher hanging fruit in the relationship, even if some gestures, such as a massive highway link are currently out of the realms of possibility.

Dipping the Toe in the Water: President Ma of Taiwan Ponders the Preconditions of a Meeting with PRC President Xi Jinping

  On July 26th in an interview with Bloomberg News , the President of Taiwan, Ma Ying-jeou stated that in regards to any potential meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping would be determined by three major conditions.  "The most important factors are whether the country needs it, whether the people support it, that we can meet with dignity--those are the things that would make it possible", Ma said regarding as what he sees as preconditions of any sort of meeting.  Looking as these conditions in a bit more depth will show that there is perhaps a diplomatic  rationale behind Ma's answer to the question posed by Bloomberg, and it could perhaps damage Taiwan's interests in the long term.

I. "Whether the country needs it"  vs "The Greater Good"  
Leaders of countries tend to choose their words carefully, as most realize that what they say will be heard, analyzed, and digested by interested parties--constituents, the media, political allies and opponents alike, as well as parties who have a vested interest in the mind set of a head of state.  While perhaps it is of no importance that President Ma stated the needs of the country before weather the people support it in his statement, it is worth commenting on.  "Whether the country needs it" could be applied in very broad and abstract terms.  For example, the President could determine that the needs of "the state" could super cede the desires of its population, a "you'll thank me later" type mindset.  President Ma has shown in both words and actions that he does hold a traditional Kuomintang mindset of Taiwan being a part of a "Greater China".  As a result, the opportunity for him to promote a "Greater China" that consists of over 1.2 billion people could perhaps be of higher importance than a high level of support among the mere 23 million people who reside in Taiwan, many of who do not support his views of a Greater China, could play a role in the thought process of how far Ma is willing to go to in order to promote the idea of a meeting with the Chinese leader. Furthermore, there appears to be no real incentive for Taiwan to enter the realm of political discussions with China at this time considering the PRC's position that such talks would not be of a state-to-state nature. Any talks that would be held between Taiwan and China under this premise would likely encode Taiwan as part of "China", a notion that could have a detrimental impact on Taiwan's ability to negotiate with the PRC in any future potential talks. (More on this aspect later)

II. "Whether the people support it"  vs. Math and Time 

In 2011, President Ma floated the idea of a potential peace agreement with the PRC that was largely met with opposition from the Taiwanese population.   The reason for a potential peace agreement being dangerous for Taiwan is a simple one: It would likely encode wording that states Taiwan is a part of "China".  Considering that nearly 98% of the world's governments recognize the People's Republic of China as being the sole legitimate government of a Chinese state, Taiwan would likely be dealt a diplomatic death blow in its ability to claim that it is a separate sovereign state apart from the People's Republic of China.  While President Ma was quick to place the idea back into his pocket, the reality is that any such summit between leaders of Taiwan and China would likely include at least some conversation about an official peace agreement.  With nearly 70% of  Taiwan against a change in the status quo, the ability for President Ma to have such a meeting with President Xi before his second term concludes at the end of 2016 is nearly impossible if the Taiwanese public's opinions are taken into consideration.   President Ma has repeatedly stated that according to The Republic of China's Constitution, China proper is not considered a separate country from Taiwan, therefore not considering the PRC as separate from Taiwan.  If peace negotiations were to begin under such pretext, the gap between China and Taiwan would be considerably smaller than if Taiwan were to insist that it was a sovereign nation separate from China.

"I'm Waiting" 

III. "Meeting with Dignity" vs. Current State of Affairs 

For over forty years the People's Republic of China has done a masterful job of diplomatically isolating Taiwan from the international community to the point of absurdity.  From large scale objectives (making states who recognize China sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan) to the smallest (in 2008, the  small African country of Malawi, upon switching recognition from Taiwan to China, was "asked" by the PRC to pull thirty students studying Mandarin Chinese in Taipei, and relocate these students to Beijing for their Chinese studies).  Under current Chinese foreign policy, it would seem improbable that China would agree to Taiwan's precondition that President Ma be referred to as "President", rather than simply the chairman of the KMT.....right? If President Ma is in fact looking to ask China to dance before his term ended, perhaps it was because China was showing a little leg from across the room.  Consider the following:

"Xi last week sent a message of congratulations to Ma on the latter's re-election as KMT chairman.  The English-language report carried by the official Xinhua News Agency described Xi as top leader of the Communist Party of China, not as the country's president. (emp added). 

By China shrewdly playing with titles,  it appears that Beijing  is attempting to placate Taipei by  placing  Ma and Xi on equal ground by basis  of their political titles, simply by removing the title of President.  While this act alone is not enough to give Ma the "dignity" that he sees as a necessary precondition for political talks, it could be the precursor of more subtle actions from Beijing to Taipei in order to superficially raise Taiwan's status in such talks, as well as lower Beijing's (if only for appearance sake) to make such talks a reality.

Xi has kicked the idea of a peace summit with Taiwan back across the Strait--a politically savvy move indeed  

Conclusion

While the possibility of a summit between Presidents Ma and Xi is unlikely at the present juncture, it cannot be dismissed.  President Ma has shown over his tenure to be someone who holds traditional Kuomintang doctrine of a greater China in high regard, as well as a desire to cement his legacy as the ROC President who brought Taiwan and China closer than any time since 1949.  The fact that Ma also stated that the more than 1,100 Chinese missiles aimed at Taiwan would be less of an impediment to a meeting with President XI than weather talks would be supported by the Taiwanese shows that he would be willing to enter into talks with not a gun pointed to his head, but rather 1,100 missiles, does not bode well for his claim in which he desires to meet with dignity with the PRC.  Ma should be careful when dipping his toes in the water---as there appear to be sharks circling within, and they smell blood.

What if? The Kuomintang's Plans for a Highway System in 1931 China

Interesting Article for the Day: 

 Another insane economic-social experiment thought up by Mao Zedong? Nope. Apparently in 1931, the Kuomintang government has its eyes on the Great Wall of China to become a national highway system .  I'm all for modernization, but seriously?  One could speculate how much of the central government's treasury funds would have been squandered on such a grand project before it was abandoned. Enough to limit the KMT's ability to wage war against the Communists? Probably not, but Chinese citizens and history buffs should be grateful that this project was never actually begun.

"...for besides its unquestioned military value, enabling the government to stamp out the incessant banditry in the interior provinces...."  -----Niiiiiice

Discovery Channel 3-Part Documentary on Taiwan's Special Forces Units

Great look into the rigorous training these elite soldiers must endure to become frogmen in the Taiwanese Armed Forces 

Enjoy! 

Part 1 is about Taiwan's Army Frogmen training 

Part 2 covers Taiwan's Underwater Operations Unit training 

Part 3 shows Taiwan's Army Ranger Training 

The Hong Kong Model: What would "One Country Two Systems" look like if it were applied to Taiwan?

If the Chinese government expects the Hong Kong Model to eventually be acceptable to the people of Taiwan, it will be sorely disappointed. 

Two American Secretaries of State, one from the past (Henry Kissinger) and one currently serving (John Kerry), have at different times in recent history stated their support for a "One China Two Systems" model that would in their view solve the long standing sovereignty dispute between Taiwan and China, which would allow for the primary impediment of improved relations between the United States and China to at long last be washed away.  If believing in this point of view, both Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Kerry would also have to accept the premise that the people of Taiwan would be accepting of such a grand bargain.  Both could be forgiven for failing to understand the complexities of  contemporary Taiwanese society: where it is currently, and the road in which it has traveled to arrive at its current point. For arguments sake, however, this article will attempt to take a speculative look at a scenario in which Taiwan were to enter into a "One China Two Systems" system that is similar to the system currently in place in Hong Kong; while taking the results of the  past 16 years of Hong Kong's experience under the system as a guide, as well as current trends in Taiwanese society.

Economics

Since the 1997 handover, Hong Kong has experienced seismic shifts both in its economic importance to Mainland China, as well as a number of troubling economic trends that have troubling signs for Hong Kong society.  In 1997, Hong Kong's contribution to the combined GDP of China plus Hong Kong stood at nearly fifteen percent, a figure that dropped to nearly three percent in 2012.  As China gets richer, Hong Kong will likely continue its downward slide of economic importance to China proper. As China's economy has been growing at well over 7.0% annually, Taiwan's GDP infusion would have an estimated  smaller impact mathematically in 2013 than that of Hong Kong in 1997, at 5.35%.

   It is not a well kept secret  that some of the strongest advocates of increasing Taiwan's relationship with China to even the point of  eventual unification are Taiwanese high level business executives who see China proper as a massive market with nearly limitless potential to turn profit, as well as having considerable political clout under such a system.  It is also likely that the stated executives wield substantially more power within Taiwanese society today than they would under a OCTS framework.  Taiwanese executives would be wise to look to the similar scenario that took place in Hong Kong in 1997--and where the  level of executive-political influence presently lies in Hong Kong.

Be careful what you wish for Terry Guo...

In 1997, officials in Beijing depended heavily on the tycoons of Hong Kong to lead the way in ensuring a stable transition from British colonial rule to Chinese control.  These business leaders did their part in placating fears among the citizenry of Hong Kong (and international investors), that an economic status-quo would be in place, and it would be business as usual within the city.  As time has passed, however, Beijing has had ample time to maneuver  its preferred leaders into prominent political and economic positions  (more on this aspect later).  Combining this fact with Hong Kong's decline in economic relevance, the tycoons who were once vital to Hong Kong's transition are now viewed by Beijing as actors who provide diminishing returns to their objectives within  the city.  In a Taiwan scenario, these tycoon types who currently hold a great deal of sway both politically and economically in Taiwan, would likely be counted on to have a similar role as their Hong Kong counterparts did.  However, these officials would quickly see their influence diminished as a result of being just a few fish within a much larger pond, and seeing their political relevance likely diminish with each year that passes by.

Socially, the economic ramifications of a One Country Two Systems (OCTS) approach would leave no aspect of Taiwanese society untouched.  With trade and investment barriers being removed on a wide scale following the handover, consider the following:

*In 2011, investors from Mainland China accounted for 25% percent of Hong Kong prime property purchases, which has resulted in pushing home prices out of reach for many aspiring middle class citizens

*Hong Kong's wealth gap, long being the highest in Asia, has reached its highest level in decades

It is more likely than not that Taiwan would experience similar results within a OCTS model.  With the housing market within Taipei already experiencing what many economists perceive as a housing bubble waiting to burst, a large influx of Chinese capital into the housing market would likely send the median home price in the city through the roof, causing even more discontent with aspiring homeowners than what currently exists.  Other major cities in Taiwan, such as Kaohsiung, Taichung, Tainan, and Hsinchu would likely see a considerable spike in real estate prices as well.

In the agricultural sector, Taiwanese farmers  would also face a bleak future, as China's agricultural industry attempts to emulate the quality of Taiwanese products, larger Chinese firms would likely have the ability to eventually produce similar products at a lower cost without the current trade barriers as a restriction to Taiwan's domestic market, forcing many producers in Taiwan to leave the industry.

In the tourism sector, Taiwan would also likely experience many of the similar effects that have been felt by Hong Kong since Mainlanders were permitted to enter the city on individual visas, rather than on the group visa program.  As Hong Kong based companies shifted much of their manufacturing base to China proper, tourism has grown as a vital economic aspect of the cities economy.  As a result, retail rental properties have skyrocketed in the city, rising as much as 32% in some prime locations, erasing the traditional landscape of some areas, such as Causeway Bay in the process.  In 2011, the retail chain Forever 21 opened its first store in Hong Kong in 2011, paying $1.4 million dollars in rent per month--the highest in the world in both total terms and square feet.

Forever 21 in Hong Kong

  While many areas in Taiwan would likely follow suit in developing areas that would cater to the influx of Chinese tourists, some would likely be in areas that are considered mainstays of Taiwanese society, such as night market areas.  It is likely that many areas within Taiwanese cities would become unrecognizable as they currently stand.


Identity 

The cultural impact within Taiwan as a result of a OCTS implementation would be massive, and the results of which are far too large to be explored in depth here, but a brief (albeit simplistic) overview is needed. Ironically, studies and polls have shown that since the 1997 handover,  residents of Hong Kong have latched on tighter to the notion of being a citizen of Hong Kong that has an identity separate from Mainland Chinese, instead of forming an identity that is one of simply being "Chinese".  In 2011, a University of Hong Kong poll asked residents to rate how strongly they felt as being a "Hong Kong citizen", with the average rating being 8.23, the highest result in 10 years.  The same participants in the poll rated their feelings about being a "Chinese citizen" at an average of 7.01--a 12-year low.  With many residents increasing their  daily contact with the population from China proper, there was likely a feeling that while ethnically bonds are indeed shared, culturally wide differences have developed over time, resulting in some level of a nationality difference.

In the case of a similar poll taking place in Taiwan 15 years after a hypothetical unification scenario, the numbers would likely be much further apart in those identifying themselves proudly as "Taiwanese" and at the same time "Chinese citizens".  For over a half-century, the citizens of Taiwan have combined (often times with considerable friction) aspects of Chinese culture from a large influx of Chinese immigrants--refugees that occurred in the mid to late 1940s with an existing Taiwanese culture that was already firmly developed prior to their arrival, sprinkled with aspects of Japanese colonial rule that lasted sixty years--without the interference of the guiding hand of the People's Republic of China.  The result could in fact be compared to the formation of a separate American cultural identity that occurred prior to the American revolution, as distance between England and its colonies allowed for such a development to occur.  For many colonists, the bloodlines did not change, but their mindset and self-identity evolved. One example in which China shows its inability to understand the complexities of the evolution of Taiwanese self-identity is the way in which it classifies the aboriginal population of Taiwan.  While Taiwan recognizes 14 distinct and separate native Taiwanese aboriginal groups within its borders-- the PRC sees one.

They're all "Gaoshan" in the eyes of Beijing

 From the perspective of Beijing, this aspect of a OCTS approach  with Taiwan would be perhaps its most daunting challenge in making such an arrangement a success.  Thus far, China's appeals to Chinese brotherhood and bloodlines (which could have been more effective in centuries past) has only appealed to a small fraction of Taiwan's population.  China would have to take a long term approach in its attempt to successfully integrate Taiwan's population into a greater China model, a task that would almost certainly fail due to Taiwan's strongly entrenched sense of self-identity that grows stronger with each day it is not under the flag of the PRC.


Political Structure and Social Freedoms --The Firewall to Annexation 

Despite the bleak economic and cultural scenarios that have been proposed in this article, the political and social freedom aspect is one that is perhaps the strongest barrier to China's objective to implement the OCTS approach with Taiwan.  If proponents of the OCTS approach towards Taiwan hope to look to Hong Kong for a viable model--upon closer inspection their hopes would likely be dashed. The following is the reality of the OCTS approach that has taken place in Hong Kong presented in bullet point form:

* Prior to the 1997 handover, the 1984 Basic Law was devised for the governance of Hong Kong. Within the framework it stated that universal suffrage was the "ultimate aim" for Hong Kong--an objective that has not yet been met.  Most observers do not believe expect the universal suffrage to occur before 2017 ( the targeted year stated by Beijing), as the provision was not included in the 2010 electoral reforms.  The Law also restricts law making powers, prohibits legislators from introducing bills that would affect Hong Kong public spending, government operations, or political structure.

* The selection of the Hong Kong's chief executive is done by a system in which special interests controlled by a small circle of wealth tycoons select the person who will take the position.  In 2012 the committee chose Leung Chun-ying, a member of the Mainland government advisory body--and the preferred candidate of Beijing.  Officials from China's Liaison Office reportedly lobbied members of the election committee to vote for Leung, and castigated media officials from critical coverage of him (source 2013 Freedom House Report on Hong Kong)

*   In 2002 Pro-Beijing lawmakers in the city attempted to pass Hong Kong Basic Law Article 23, which included the following:

• Any branch of an organization that is part of an organization banned by the central government of the PRC under state security reasons can be banned in Hong Kong at any time, and the Hong Kong government does not have to conduct any independent investigation.

• The concepts of government and country are confused and exchangeable in the proposed document. In a democratic country, citizens are empowered with the right to monitor and check the government. The proposed enactment of Article 23 makes opposing the government the same as opposing the country.

• In the proposed enactment, police are allowed to enter residential buildings and arrest people at any time without court warrants or evidence.

• Any speech deemed as instigative can be regarded as illegal, including oral, written and electronic forms; it is a crime both to express, and to hear such speech and fail to report it.

• Permanent residents of Hong Kong are under the power of this law, no matter where they reside. People who are in Hong Kong are also under the power of Article 23, regardless of nationality, including people who visit or transit through Hong Kong. Violations of Article 23 can result in a life term in prison. 

-Mass protests by the citizens of Hong Kong forced the legislature to suspend the vote and implementation of Article 23

-However in 2009, the territory of Macau (which was transferred from Portugal to China in 1999 ) passed the Macau Basic Law, which has exactly the same wording as Article 23 of the Hong Kong Basic Law.

Media Suppression  in Hong Kong since 1997 

Exerpts taken from the 2013 Freedom House Report

"A 2012 poll conducted by the Hong Kong Journalists Association (HKJA) found that for the first time, journalists’ concerns about tighter government control over access to information surpassed self-censorship as the most commonly cited threat to media freedom. Over the past two years, officials have increasingly used off-the-record briefings to announce policies and released official footage for news events rather than opening them to the press, while the police and fire departments have released less detailed and timely information about newsworthy incidents."

"In January, Wang Xiangwei, a mainlander who had once worked for the state-run China Daily, became the editor in chief of the popular local English-language paper South China Morning Post. He was accused of censoring the Post’s coverage of the suspicious death of Chinese dissident Li Wangyang in June, and of refusing to renew a contract with an award-winning reporter known for his articles about Beijing’s poor human rights record."

" Hong Kong journalists aiming to report from the mainland must obtain press cards from Beijing’s Liaison Office, though even with accreditation, they are often subject to surveillance, threats, beatings, and occasional detention by mainland authorities."

"At least three mainlanders were beaten or sentenced to labor camps after returning home from the July 1 protest in Hong Kong, the first such known cases of mainlanders punished for attending Hong Kong demonstrations."

As frustrated as Hong Kong residents are with their current political situation, it is vastly different from a potential Taiwan OCTS scenario for one primary reason.  The people of Taiwan have spilled considerable blood in their quest to establish a democratic form of representative government, and for this reason the vast majority of its citizens would be unequivocally opposed to any change that could effect their current democratic abilities.  While China has promised to maintain Taiwan's current governmental structure (with the exception of managing foreign policy), it would be impossible for it to do so.  The people of Taiwan would have the ability to elect representatives who could not only push back Chinese interests within Taiwan, the potential for speaking of Taiwanese independence would certainly be a possibility, something that Beijing does not have to deal with regarding the mindset of any large group in Hong Kong (....yet).  Such a scenario would force Beijing to allocate large resources towards maintaining public order inside Taiwan, and confronting millions of people who have become well-versed in the tactics of self-expression and have had prior exposure to living in a free and democratic society-- a potentially potent combination that could give Beijing headaches for years...or decades.  

In conclusion, there is no objective observer who could state that Taiwan and the majority of her population would beneficially gain from any sort of OCTS approach that is currently in place between Mainland China and Hong Kong.  Economic gains would be reaped by the top of Taiwanese society, while the rest of the population would likely see the gradual, if not subtle erosion of basic liberties that have become pillars of a modern Taiwanese society.  The government in Beijing likely sees a similar picture, as it continues to espouse an annexation of Taiwan by speaking of vague ancient territorial claims and a shared bloodline. Yet the people of Taiwan do not live in the past or seem willing to trade their hard-earned freedoms for something as tribal  as a shared ethnicity.  All the while citizens of Hong Kong look enviously across the Taiwan Strait to see what it is that they themselves desire most.  A society that still has the option to make a choice about its own future.