Analysis of East Asian politics, state military capabilities, culture, and current events. Focused primarily on Taiwan, China, North and South Korea, Vietnam, Singapore, and Japan.
With last week's tragic attack in Boston, recent provocative statements taken by North Korea, and the start of Major League baseball, it could be understandable that certain global events could have taken place beneath the radar of the American Intelligence community. Luckily, we have Congressman Michael McCaul (R-TX) to expose the growing threat to the American way of life that is the Kingdom of Bhutan.
Last week, Congressman McCaul co-sponsored a bill in the US House of Representatives that sought to have the United States normalize diplomatic relations with Taiwan. On McCaul's Congressional website, there is a statement regarding the reason behind the bill. Within this statement were two sentences that caught this authors eye:
"Today, Taiwan is one of only five countries in the world with which the United States does not have diplomatic relations. Taiwan does not deserve to be associated with bad actors such as Bhutan, Cuba, Iran, and North Korea."
Bhutan?
While this little-known Kingdom has always been of interest to me, I was needless to say shocked about this recent intelligence windfall that has shattered my perceptions of Bhutan. As painful as it was, it became necessary for me to delve deeper into the newest member of the "bad actor club".
The Government of Bhutan:
In 2005, Bhutan's King Jigme Singye Wangchuck announced to his nation that national elections would take place in three years time that would dilute the powers of Bhutan's absolute monarchy, and transition into a constitutional monarchy. The power hungry King followed through on this decree and elections peacefully proceeded in 2008. Wangchuck further consolidated his power by declaring that himself and future kings could be impeached by a two-thirds vote in Bhutan's National Assembly.
The ego of King Wangchuck is equal to the size of his country
Human Rights: In the past decade, Bhutan has introduced a brutal method of suppression in which it can closely monitor even the most closely guarded feelings of its people.
Armed Forces:
It is without question that the budget and resources of Bhutan's military forces is just cause for America's top military brass to endure sleepless nights. It is believed that Bhutan's military budget is in the neighborhood of $13.7 million, or a little less than half of the 2013 salary to Yankees inactive third baseman, Alex Rodriguez.
Below are some photos of Bhutan's elite military units
Bhutan's feared 2nd artillery corps
The 7th armored division of Bhutan's Army is widely feared throughout Central Asia.
Bhutan's basic training for its marines is known to rank among the most grueling of the world's military units
As shown by this picture, Bhutan's government's complete disregard for the environment allows for heavy layers of smog to hide many of its reported chemical and biological storage facilities.
One can only hope that Congressman McCaul's raising of the issue regarding this bloodthirsty nation's ambitions does not fall on deaf ears in Washington before it is too late.
Yesterday US Secretary of State John Kerry met with Chinese government officials to press for that country's assistance in lowering the temperature in the region that has been caused by increasingly bellicose behavior by North Korea. While Beijing has been concerned regarding the increased American military buildup in the region over the past few weeks, it only needs to look inward for whom to blame.
Over the past month the United States has been forced to respond to the escalating diplomatic and military posture of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (aka North Korea) in a carefully calculated fashion. It is during this time that the United States has reassured two of its closest allies in the region the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan by both words and actions that it will not be pushed into the diplomatic trap that the DPRK has laid out to be fallen into. Although the United States has taken some precautionary measures in the form of missile defense batteries in Guam and in the near future for Alaska, it has thus far shown considerable restraint towards further military posturing in the region towards North Korea possibly with the thought process that further actions could back North Korea's leader Kim Jong-un into a corner in which he could feel forced to respond with military action towards it---or be faced with a potential backlash from his military commanders who remain skeptical of his military credentials.
While the United States has been forced to show its commitment to not only its allies in the region, but to maintaining overall stability in the region itself, China has thus far elected to remain in the background and refusing to take responsibility in not only a leadership role in the region; but it has also done little to use its considerable influence with North Korea in lowering the temperature of an increasingly heated situation.
The current situation on the Korean Peninsula is once again presenting a clear choice for states in the region to view two distinct policies between those of the United States and China regarding regional stability. In recent years China has used its increasingly strengthened economic portfolio and modernizing military to push territorial claims in the South and East China Sea, which has in turn forced states such as Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam to reconsider the level of trust that it is willing to place in China's long term regional ambitions, with the results being increased cooperation with the United States on a variety of levels, including enhanced military cooperation. In October, the Philippines announced that it would allow the United States navy to return to Subic Bay on a semi-permanent basis--likely the result of China's increased maritime activity in the Scarborough Shoal area. Vietnam has also made overtures to the US regarding use of its deep water port in Cam Ranh Bay. Such actions taken by these states are not the result of American actions, but rather due to Beijing's.
The current situation on the Korean Peninsula offers an opportunity for China to show that it is willing to take on the role of a responsible leader in the region; instead it has shown that it is not ready to embrace such a position. To date, the Chinese leadership has only offered token statements, urging restraint and calm directed at both North Korea and the United States. China holds considerable leverage over its long-time ally, with the DPRK dependent upon nearly 70% of its total trade with China. Such leverage gives Beijing myriad options in pressuring Pyongyang to reign in its provocative behavior. Yet to date, the only major known activity that the PRC has taken regarding the current situation is that it has looked to fortify its border with North Korea in the scenario that conflict takes place and it can potentially stop millions of North Korean refugees from flooding across the Yalu River border that separates the two countries.
The current situation in North Korea shows yet another example why the PRC leadership is not yet ready to take on a trusted leadership role in Eastern Asia. Some US government officials, scholars, and think tank officials have theorized that by bending to China's position on specific issues, such as Taiwan, human rights, and other positions taken by Beijing that run counter to American interests, China will be more willing to take on a leadership role in cases such as using its influence on North Korea to maintain stability in the region. While the citizens of China have increasingly begun to question its governments relationship with North Korea, perhaps CCP leader Xi Jinping should do the same.
Over the past month, numerous media outlets in the United States have responded to statements and posturing from inside the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) by labeling the course of events as "the crisis on the Korean peninsula", complete with the standard video footage of goose-stepping North Korean soldiers marching in unison down Kim il-Sung Square,rocket testing , and cheering throngs of DPRK citizens appearing to be joined in unison with the mission of supporting their leader to their death if it required.
While there has undoubtedly been a substantial increase in threatening rhetoric from Pyongyang over the past few months, as well as diplomatic-military actions that should be taken seriously by it's neighbors (and of course, the United States), the question that should be asked is actually twofold: Just how dangerous is the present situation on the Korean Peninsula, and why is the DPRK electing to take what many analysts see as provocative actions now?
While the first question posed can be answered at least to some degree by simply having an understanding of the military capabilities of the major actors in the region, the second question is perhaps more important, and requires a deeper look into the political structure of the DPRK.
The Major Political-Military Actors within the DPRK
Kim Jong-un: The supreme leader of the DPRK since 2011. Kim was preceded as leader by his father, Kim Jong-il, who ruled from 1994-2011, and Jong-un's grandfather, Kim Il-sung, who founded the DPRK in 1948. The bloodline of Kim's family has been the only leadership known to the people of North Korea since its inception, and it is important to note that while Kim Il-sung had unquestioned revolutionary credentials (at least with savvy rewrites of history, courtesy of party officials) upon his ascension to lead the DPRK following his military struggles against the occupying Japanese forces in the early half of the 20th century, both Jong-il and Jong-un have had to undergo risky power consolidation procedures in which gaining support of the military leadership was paramount to a permanent succession. Although Kim Jong-il lacked the romantic biography of his father, Kim Il-sung implemented his succession in deliberate phases throughout the span of nearly three decades, allowing for key military leadership positions to be filled with Jong-il loyalists, as well as cultivating a personality cult that would solidify his legitimacy among North Korea's populace. Kim Jong-il did not plan his succession with the same foresight as his father, and analysts questioned for years who would actually take the reigns of the country upon his death. While many speculated that it would be Jong-il's oldest son, Kim Jong-nam who would preside as the next DPRK leader, the bizarre episode of Jong-nam attempting to visit Tokyo's Disney World under a Dominican Passport reportedly embarrassed Jong-il to the level that he decided upon Kim Jong-un. Jong-il only had a very short time (under two years) to begin the delicate process of grooming his son as his successor, and as a result of his sudden death, was not able to fully ensure his son's smooth transition to power.
Jang Sung-Taek: One of the more acute political decisions made by Kim Jong-il before his death was to appoint his brother-in-law, Jang Sung-Taek as a behind the scenes "caretaker" of Kim Jong-un to aid in the power transition, along with Jang's wife Kim Kyong-Hui. Jang was a long-time trusted political confidant to Jong-il, and was also in charge in leading the military units responsible for protecting the highest echelons of North Korean leadership. Jang could be seen as a political moderate (at least in North Korean terms), as he has previously made numerous trips to Chinese cities with the mission of finding aspects of the Chinese economic system that could be implemented into the antiqued DPRK model.
Kim Kyong-Hui: Sister of the late Kim Jong-il and husband to Jang Sung-Taek who welds considerable power within the DPRK military structure, and is often considered a hard-liner who is likely one of the chief architects behind the DPRK's increasingly aggressive posture. While disappearing from view for over five years (2003-2009), she reappeared to take part in the transition role with Jong-un prior to her brother's death. It would appear that Jang Sung-taek and Kim Kyong-hui provide a counterbalance to each other regarding economic liberalization and military hard line stances.
North Korean Military Leadership:
In spite of the long-standing economic woes of the DPRK, the practice of the country's leadership has been to provide resources, incentives, and "perks" to its military leadership at the expense of economic development within the country. As a result of this practice, support of the DPRK military is paramount to regime survival within the state. During the initial transition phase for Kim Jong-un, the 2010 torpedo attack on a South Korean naval vessel and the North Korean artillery bombardment of the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong were widely seen as moves approved by Kim Jong-il taken with the goal of securing military support for the eventual leadership transition. North Korea's Defense Minister, Kim Kyok Sik, is believed by analysts to be a hard-liner who has unquestioned support throughout the DPRK's military structure.
So Why Now?
Although there are myriad factors that are likely behind the recent actions-statements coming from the DPRK, there appears to be a highly calculated method behind what could appear to be reckless military posturing.
The DPRK does not fail to vociferously oppose the annual military joint training exercises between South Korea and the United States. This year, however, the exercises were preceded by another DPRK underground nuclear test, as well as a series of missile tests. Despite warnings of military action from the DPRK, the joint exercises took place without incident. The North Korean leadership has once again shown its ability to manufacture a crisis with outside forces in order to garner political support from both its domestic population, as well as its military leadership. Jong-un has been able to use the manufactured crisis to portray himself as a confident and caring leader of the DPRK, as shown below....
As well as a capable military tactician...
These carefully crafted public relations pieces are made not only for the DPRK's public and military viewing, but for international consumption as well with a message that is becoming increasingly apparent: Kim Jong-un is in charge of the DPRK and has the support of its military. Yet the issue remains as to why the DPRK is choosing the present time to raise the tensions to the current level. This is where the complexities of the North Korean political system need to be understood.
Diplomatic Currency
If the DPRK does not have the intention of embarking on a military adventure that would likely spell its demise, then what is it doing? The idea of using multilateral state talks regarding its nuclear program to extract economic concessions appear to be an impossibility due to two factors. The first is the DPRK's public statements referring to its nuclear capabilities as the "country's life", and that it would not trade the capability for concessions. The second is a factor that has not been widely reported in global media coverage regarding the crisis, which is the April 1st meeting of the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly in Pyongyang.
In this meeting, a series of laws were passed in which not only make it a crime for DPRK officials to even negotiate the country's nuclear capability, but the laws also ensure the country's nuclear capabilities will remain intact for the foreseeable future. Perhaps even more importantly, the DPRK coded the usage of its nuclear weapons into law as being that of a defensive nature. Some portions of the laws include:
"They serve the purpose of deterring and
repelling the aggression and attack of the enemy against the DPRK and
dealing deadly retaliatory blows at the strongholds of aggression until
the world is denuclearized" "The DPRK shall neither use nukes against the
non-nuclear states nor threaten them with those weapons unless they join
a hostile nuclear weapons state in its invasion and attack on the DPRK" "The DPRK shall strive hard to defuse the danger
of a nuclear war and finally build a world without nukes and fully
support the international efforts for nuclear disarmament against
nuclear arms race"
Upon looking at the recent laws passed within the DPRK assembly (laws that need to have the consent of the current Jong-un faction prior to being voted upon), the fog begins to lift from the decision making process in the DPRK political leadership, in which the Jong-un camp is stating to the military leadership:
"The country's nuclear weapons program (a primary deterrent in the country's resistance to foreign military action as well as source of pride within the military) will not be negotiated away and will remain a major aspect of the DPRK's military capabilities........ you can place your trust in us"
Yet many analysts may pose the question: "If the North Korean leadership is now stating that it does not wish to even discuss its nuclear program, what does it have left to bargain with?" The DPRK's solution could be one in which it looks to "print diplomatic currency", much in the same fashion that countries left without capital print physical currency in the wake of an economic crisis. The DPRK leadership could discuss the following in the near future (all of which were "diplomatic currency" that it did not hold prior to 2013):
1. The reestablishment of communication between the DPRK and ROK-US military forces at the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) checkpoint on the North-South Korean border
2. Stating that it will not resume production at its Yongbyon nuclear facility
3. Cease long-range missile testing
4. Negotiate a resumption of its 1953 armistice agreement with South Korea
All of these potential talking points were made possible by the DPRK by creating a crisis scenario in which it could take away such agreements in order to bring them back when the political climate was suitable.
Even if and when Kim Jong-un and his faction elect to lower tensions with outside actors, it will not be a rapid process. Recent United States military actions in response to DPRK statements and actions have included short-term responses (the stationing of F-22 Raptor's in South Korea and missile interceptor systems on its military bases in Guam) to long-term (announcement of missile interceptor systems to be placed in Alaska estimated to be in place by 2015) will not likely be reversed anytime soon. The political temperature has reached a point to where it will take a series of measures on both sides to lower it to acceptable levels. In the likely scenario in which tensions do gradually ease between the DPRK and the United States, it will likely be Kim Jong-un who scores the greatest political victory---as he will be portrayed to the people of North Korea, as well as its military--as the fearless leader who successfully stopped American aggression towards their beloved homeland (albeit aggression that was masterfully concocted by the DPRK leadership). Yet one question remains unanswered. Although North Korean posturing has taken place in various forms over the years to secure its leadership's standing domestically, why has Jong-un's faction taken it to such dangerously high levels? The answer may lie in the leadership's long term plans of economic liberalization.
A Dangerous Domestic Game:
In order to raise North Korea's economy from the dead, the Jong-un faction realizes that changes must be made. Before such changes are made there are two factors to be considered. The first is that military loyalty and support must be unquestioned. Any changes in the economic system could jeopardize the current "military first" arrangement that is in place of monetary allocation given towards the military compared to the rest of North Korean sectors. Before any changes take place in the current economic system in North Korea, the military leadership would have to feel secure that its place in the DPRK's societal pecking order would remain unchanged. The Jong-un faction has looked to secure this loyalty judging by its recent actions.
Secondly, the most rapidly growing sector of the North Korean economy is not in its agricultural or industrial sectors, but rather, in an area in which it is difficult to measure in either monetary or social terms: the black market.
Heavy unregulated economic activity within the borders of the DPRK likely sends shivers down the spine of the leadership, as it is increasingly losing its ability to monitor the daily activities of its citizens, as well as the flow of unfiltered information both entering and leaving North Korea. The flourishing of the North Korean black market has taken place primarily around the areas of its border with China at the Yalu River. It is here that cellular phones, radios, DVD and VHS recordings (many which show a flourishing South Korea), and nearly anything else with monetary value is available to an ever-growing black market consumer base. While attempting to put the genie back into the bottle completely is not likely for the DPRK ruling class, it must at least attempt to provide an economic alternative to its citizens if it is to stave off a rapidly growing alternative economy.
Author and North Korean expert Bradley Martin, stated a similar point in an article printed yesterday:
"Some foreign analysts say
his theory is that the nuclear deterrent gives him sufficient job
security that he can economize on the conventional military and plow the
resulting peace dividend into improvement of the civilian economy."
Having his uncle Jang Sung-taek by his side certainly raises the possibility that such thoughts may be behind the Jong-un camp's rationale behind such recent moves. Additionally, the fact remains that although the rhetoric coming out of Pyongyang recently has been colorful and fierce, unlike past cases of tension between the DPRK and its rivals, there has not yet been a shot fired (unless one wishes to count the DPRK's nuclear testing and missile tests, which would not be unreasonable). Tensions do remain high, however, and it would not take a major incident to light the tinderbox, resulting in a potentially terrifying military scenario---heightened tensions tend not to allow for smaller mistakes or misunderstandings to go without a response. Yet if the Jong-un regime feels that it has sufficiently made it point to its domestic audience--both civilian and military--then it could choose to gradually lower the temperature and declare itself the victor in the diplomatic standoff. Such an outcome would be quietly welcomed by Washington, Seoul, and Beijing. And perhaps in the not-so-distant future, the people of North Korea would benefit economically as well.
Wendell Minnick reported in Defense News on Wednesday that “Taiwan has suspended an effort to convince the U.S. government to release a squadron of F-16C/D Block 50/52 fighter jets to cover the downtime of one F-16A/B squadron undergoing lengthy upgrades.” While such a move is not entirely unexpected (as Taiwan has waited patiently for an answer regarding its request for a total of 66 block C/D's since 2007), if true it could potentially damage Taiwan's standing with one of its most staunch supporters: The United States Congress. While Taiwan has looked to stop asking for C/D's to cover the offline time of A/B squadron's that are being upgraded, the request was not ever likely to be fulfilled, as such a move would have crossed one of China's self-imposed "red lines" in terms of weapon sales to Taiwan. Additionally, Taiwan asking for the "temporary use" of C/D's while its existing fleet of A/B's were being upgraded was a crafty request, but one that it likely did not have much hope of being fulfilled. While Taiwan still states that it does desire its full request of C/D fighters, it has not made an official request to the United States to fulfill the request since 2007. Many members of Congress have been pressing the State Department and both the Bush and Obama White House to approve the request with a higher sense of urgency than even Taiwanese government officials have done publicly in the past 6 years.
The Taiwan-United States relationship is one of the few issues in Congress that has consistently maintained bi-partisan support, as its members have by and large attempted to force reluctant Presidential Administrations (and often State Department officials) to adhere to the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 that ensures “...the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” Although the current Obama Administration (and previous Bush Administration) did not approve the sale of the F-16 C/D to Taiwan, pressure was being applied by Congress to do so.
Senator John Cornyn (R-TX) wrote a series of letters to the White House, asking that it send Taiwan's F-16 purchase request to Congress for ratification. In April of 2012, there was a marked change of tone from previous White House responses:
"We are mindful of and share your concerns about Taiwan's growing shortfall in fighter aircraft as the F-5s are retired from service and notwithstanding the upgrade of the F-16A/Bs. We recognize that China has 2,300 operational combat aircraft, while our democratic partner Taiwan has only 490. We are committed to assisting Taiwan in addressing the disparity in numbers of aircraft through our work with Taiwan's defense ministry on its development of a comprehensive defense strategy vis-a-vis China," --Robert Nabors, Director of White House Legislative Affairs
Additionally, recent bills in the U.S. Congress have addressed the F-16 C/D issue. The Taiwan Policy Act of 2011 (HR 2918), and The Taiwan Policy Act of 2013 (HR 419) both included language that would have placed a great deal of pressure on the Obama Administration to accept Taiwan's Letter of Request (LoR), and allow Congress to vote on the requested sale; a sale that would likely be passed if brought to a vote in the House and Senate. Such a decision by the Ma Administration to fore go the F-16 request, while members of Congress have been spending considerable political capital to push the issue in both the Legislative and Executive branches of American government, could cause many long time supporters of Taiwan in Congress to question that countries' level of national security commitment.
While Taiwan's recent Quadrennial Defense Review stated that the Ministry of National Defense will look to develop 4th generation indigenous fighter aircraft in place of the F-16 C/D fighters, such a proposal is a long-term goal, and does not fill Taiwan's immediate air force needs (as a sizable portion of its fleet are aging F-5 aircraft that are slated to be retired within two years). Additionally, Taiwan has stated its desire to not only develop its own 4th generation fighter; but to acquire a modern submarine fleet as well. Such platforms will take years, if not decades to acquire, and will take billions to secure---an amount that Taipei has not recently been willing to spend.
This recent development, coinciding with Taiwan's low annual defense budget of nearly 2.2% (that does not reach close to President Ma's pre-2008 campaign goal of at least 3.0%), will likely be a cause of concern among members of Congress until the current administration shows a renewed commitment to Taiwan's national defense.
It is understandable if upon an initial observation one failed to find a correlation between current British jurisdiction of the Falkland Islands and the Chinese Communist Party's objective of the annexation of Taiwan. After all, there is no apparent history that would connect the two disputed territories where such a comparison would easily be made. Yet upon further examination, the recent referendum vote on the Falkland Islands, and the statements from Argentinian government (which continues to lay claim to the islands) that followed, could be carefully studied by the Chinese leadership in Beijing as a method in which it could modify its claim on Taiwan in the future if present trends within Taiwanese society continue.
From historic, geographic, and social points of view, the Falkland Islands share a number of similarities with Taiwan. Both have been "discovered" and claimed by multiple states throughout the previous centuries, both lie in proximity to powerful regional states that claim them as sovereign territory, and both have populations that do not wish to alter the current "status quo" in terms of their political arrangements.
For those familiar with Taiwanese history, the following will sound eerily familiar:
While a number of states had dealings of various levels with the Falkland Islands, it was the British who finally established a firm grip on the territories during the beginning of the 20th Century, previously Argentina had established a presence on the island, but were pushed out by a stronger British navy. Argentina, however, never relinquished its claims on the islands, and continued to negotiate with the British regarding their status. Such negotiations led to the first direct air links between Argentina and the Islands, as well as an agreement that gave the Argentine national gas company exclusive rights to the Falklands' energy needs. Yet the British Governor of the islands, in his first cable back to England stated that "There is no way we will convince these islanders that they will be better off as part of Argentina".
In 1982, in an attempt to reclaim the territories, Argentina invaded the Falklands with the hope that a smaller British military presence in the region would enhance the possibility of recapturing the islands. A war ensued and the islands have remained under British jurisdiction until present day. Argentina continues to claim that the islands are part of its territory, due to the fact that it gained independence from Spain in 1816, and the islands were taken away by force by the British years later in 1833.
China, much in the same context, has claimed that Taiwan is an inherent part of its territory due to the fact that it believes upon establishment of the PRC in 1949, all previous territory that was under the jurisdiction of the ROC was to then be considered part of the newly established PRC. And much as Argentina believes that it is being denied its rightful territory by a stronger illegal occupier in Great Britain, China has long felt Taiwan has been under the protection of the United States.
On March 9th, a referendum was carried out on the Falkland Islands asking the question: "Do you wish the Falkland Islands to retain their current political status as an Overseas Territory of the United Kingdom?" Although the island only maintains a permanent population of less than 2,000 people, the results were conclusive: 1,514 voted "yes" with 3 voting "no", with a turnout of 92%. The voters of the islands were able to vote without fear of large Argentinian neighbor threatening military action due to a British military presence on the island, and voted accordingly. If the residents of Taiwan were given a similar vote on maintaining its current status, or to choose joining the PRC, the results, while surely not reaching the 92% range, would surely have the same results that were reached on the Falklands if its citizens were given the same scenario of security.
The Falkland Scenario is one that Beijing must prepare on two levels. First, it must realize that the Taiwanese identity will strengthen, not weaken over time, and its overtures of cultural bondage with the people of Taiwan will increasingly fall on deaf ears as time progresses. The current methods of economic carrots and its perceived notions of historical-ethnic ties with people on Taiwan do not have the staying power that will bring about the outcome Beijing desires. Undoubtedly, the PRC is aware that if Taiwan were permitted to have a similar Falkland referendum, the results would wash away any perceptions of a peaceful annexation of Taiwan with both Taiwanese and Chinese alike. With this reality, China must justify potential military action towards Taiwan by looking through another prism.
Following the March 9th Falkland referendum, Argentinian ambassador to Britain, Alicia Castro made a shrewd comment regarding the outcome, stating "We respect that (the islanders) want to stay being British, but the territory they inhabit is not." In one simple sentence, Castro was able to separate the people residing on the Falklands from the territory itself. Realizing that no volume of economic carrots would alter the mindset of its citizens, the argument was shifted to one of simply territorial rights. Could the PRC eventually choose to follow the Argentina-Falklands territory model? With each year that passes without a resolution between Taiwan and China over their differences, the possibility grows more likely. China could choose to read the writing on the wall and see that no amount of lop-sided economic treaties, no amount of references to "Chinese brotherhood" will alter the growing strength of Taiwanese identity, and could elect to deal with Taiwan as a territorial issue--- simply a lost piece of territory---people be damned. If China's objective to annex Taiwan were to be achieved without the need to separate the issues of people and territory, the offer of a "Hong Kong style" of arrangement in the attempt to placate Taiwan's population could be off the table, and in its place an occupied Taiwan could feel more like Tibet or Xinjiang. Hopefully, the PRC does not look to Buenos Aires for a philosophy to justify territorial claims to follow.
Throughout the past two decades, various administrations in Taiwan have expressed interest in modernizing the country's submarine fleet. However, high acquisition costs, political pressure from China, and resistance from many within the American defense industry have all placed obstacles in front of Taipei's objective of acquiring such a platform.
There are also some experts who question if Taiwan's goal to acquire modern submarines is a wise one. The following are portions from an interview done with a leading authority on submarine-naval warfare regarding Taiwan's desires for modern submarines, as well as the abilities of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to counter such a platform. The expert wished to remain anonymous due to the sensitivity of the topics.
Drawbacks to Taiwan Acquiring Submarines: " I think that Taiwan would be more secure by not buying submarines, and should instead buy or develop things like more, smaller anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM)-equipped fast attack craft (FAC), mobile coastal defense cruise missiles (CDCM), mobile short ranged surface-to-air missiles, moblile multiple launch rocket launchers, and infrastructure that can withstand a PLA bombardment while still providing basic services to Taiwan's population." "The other parts to carefully consider are the answers to questions such as: 1. How many submarines could Taiwan get? (Answer: probably very few) 2. How many submarines can Taiwan keep seaworthy and capable of performing their mission? (Answer: Probably fewer than the previous answer - submarines break, a lot, and are very difficult to maintain. Roger, Taiwan already does pretty well at that, however.) 3. When would Taiwan actually get any new submarines? (Answer: probably not quickly, perhaps only in decades, and yet Taiwan needs enhanced defenses very quickly.) 4. What would be the wartime missions of the submarine, and can other cheaper things do those missions as well or better? (Answer: I think they can be used for counter-blockade, counter invasion, and counter-commerce. I think counter-blockade can be done better by CDCMs, by attack helicopters, mines, and by ASCM-equipped fast-attack craft. So too can counter-invasion. I think counter-commerce is an unnecessary, ultimately ineffective, needlessly escalatory, and counter-productive mission for Taiwan.) 5. What are the peacetime mission submarines would perform? (Answer: ISR, but the things that submarines can provide to Taiwan can probably be gotten much more cheaply via other means.)" The Current State of China's Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW) Capabilities: "The short, flippant, and accurate answer is they are weak in nearly every aspect of ASW, but I also see a recent emphasis on taking steps to remedy that weakness. So, we've recently seen internet photos of a Y-8 that looks as if it is a maritime patrol aircraft, Z-9s, Z-9s, and other ASW-related helicopters, more Yuans being launched, and pictures of towed array sonars that are allegedly on some PLAN frigates. Those all represent a start, but China faces a very long march before it achieves anything approaching ASW prowess. This could be taken as a reason for Taiwan to invest in submarines, right? However, I think that that is only part of the issue."
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