Recent Geopolitical Developments in the East Asian Region

Busy doing research for the next few weeks for an upcoming project, so for now enjoy these links on recent developments taking place regarding the East Asian geopolitical scene.

Going Long

The United States navy is getting closer to developing its own "Carrier Killer" missile platform, the long-range anti-ship missile (LRASM).  The development is a necessary one for the U.S. military, as it looks to maintain the capability to strike adversaries from a distance outside a "danger zone" where its strike carrier fleets could remain relatively safe, from say an enemy ballistic missile threat.  Testing is likely to continue into 2014, and the project should remain safe from the recent federal government sequester budget cuts.

The Winds of Change 

James Holmes of the US Naval War College writes a great piece on Japan's need to change it's military structure.

China upset over US support of Taiwan's ICAO Observer Status....When they should be celebrating

China recently expressed its protest over a recent law signed by President Obama that supported Taiwan's bid for observer status in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a UN-sponsored organization that promotes safe air travel, as well as keeps member states aware of the most up to date aviational safety regulations.  Rather than protesting, however, officials in Beijing should be doing this.  Why? Because for nearly 20 years the United States has held an official position of supporting Taiwan's Full Membership into international organizations that do not require statehood as a prerequisite. Taiwan officials in Washington DC (known by their acronym as TECRO officials) still insisted on pushing for observer status regardless.  I spoke about this particular issue when the bill was signed into law on Michael Turton's Taiwan-based site.

Brian Benedictus noted that there was a big TECRO (the Taiwan representative office in the US) push for this, remarking:

"[TECRO] knew what they were doing---which is setting a precedent--Which is to ask (and receive) support from Congress on Taiwan's international participation in a lesser degree than they should. This was a bad precedent to set, and Taiwan's international space actually got a little smaller tonight."

China releases its report on US-Japan Military Power 2012 

While the report is relatively void of aggressive wording against the United States per say, it does have a theme in which it states that US military exercises in the region are directed against China, and are not helpful for bilateral relations:

 "...exercises prepared against the so-called A2/AD threats are clearly targeting China and Iran. Exercises such as Internal Look 2012 and Austere Challenge 2012 are clearly aimed at Iran, while exercises such as Gold Cobra 2012, Balikatan 2012,RIMPAC 2012 are clearly targeting China. The exercises which were large in scale,high in frequency and intensity, and especially those that took place when tension in the region rose, naturally caused concern and anxiety, which in turn further intensified the situation, exerting a negative impact on world peace, stability, cooperation, and development."

Russian Vessels conducting  maneuvers during a recent joint exercise with Chinese military forces

The Chinese paper does not, however, mention recent joint-exercises that took place near Japan that consisted of PLA and Russian forces that were widely seen in Japan as provocative in nature.

Taiwan Reportedly Lobbying US Congress for assistance in acquiring new submarine platform

     What a difference a year makes.  In 2012 the hot topic around the beltway  regarding the U.S.-Taiwan arms sales relationship was seemingly focused on the long-pending sale of the F-16 C/D platform to Taiwan  (Actually this "pending" authorization has been in limbo for over twenty years and has covered four U.S. Presidential administrations).  With Sen. John Cornyn (R-TX) leading the charge, many members of Congress were placing pressure on  the Obama Administration into authorizing the sale of the fighter jet platform, which would then allow for Congress to vote on the issue.  However, at least publicly, the Taiwanese government made no statements vocally to coincide with the U.S. Congressional push, and the issue of F-16's has remained in a state of limbo ever since.  During this time, the issue of another long standing request from Taiwan was considered dead in the water: the 2001 approval from the Bush Administration authorizing the sale of 8 diesel-electric submarines to Taiwan.  It's well known among those who follow this issue the complex logistics that would be involved in making this sale a reality, and this blog has a previous 2-part article discussing in depth the complexities of the issue.  However, a brief overview:

1.  The United States has not domestically produced diesel submarines since the 1950's, therefore it would likely need to find a third country that would be willing to aid Taiwan in either the production of the requested submarines, or more likely, transfer the blueprints to either Taiwan or the United States for production.

2.  Third countries have been reluctant to agree to such a sale for fear of Chinese economic reprisals.

     Yet in 2013 among many think tanks, military experts, and US government officials the issue of Taiwan acquiring submarines has suddenly.....pardon the pun....resurfaced.

The Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Congressman Ed Royce (R-CA), visited a Taiwanese Naval yard in Kaohsiung, and brought attention to Taiwan aging guppy-class subs, stating a need for Taiwan to modernize its submarine fleet. One source with knowledge to the visit stated that the Ma Administration was not aware that the issue of submarines was going to be brought up during the visit, and following the visit was "rather receptive" to the idea of pushing for the long-stalled purchase.  In addition to the Royce visit, a number of officials inside the halls of Congress have stated that Taiwanese officials from its TECRO office in DC have approached them in recent months regarding ways in which the sale could be facilitated.  The officials stated that the the talks focused primarily upon finding a third country that would be willing to transfer the blueprints and expertise to the United States, and then transferred to Taiwan, where the submarines would be built. American defense companies, most likely General Dynamics or Northrop Grumman, would be contracted to implement the weapon systems and electronics into the completed submarines. The sources also state that TECRO officials have specifically suggested that the United States "specifically approach Nordic countries to assess their interest in such a project." Currently, Sweden is the only Nordic country that actively has a domestic submarine production capability (although Denmark, Norway, and Finland  have the ability to transfer the technology on a smaller scale).

In 2006, a Swedish HSwMs Gotland-class submarine "defeated" a U.S. Navy carrier  in an exercise, as it  penetrated  the American defensive measures, essentially "sinking" the carrier. 

From the perspective of American interests in the region, increasingly aggressive behavior by various Chinese agencies in the disputed areas of the South and East China Sea over the past year could have triggered a change of heart regarding the importance of Taiwan obtaining the platform. The strategic benefits for Taiwan would be obvious:
- The ability to counter a potential PLAN blockade of Taiwan would allow Taiwan to keep vital sea lanes of communication open for potential American assistance in a conflict scenario---which is vital for Taiwan's chances of surviving such a conflict.
-Enhanced mine-laying capabilities
-Asymmetrical counter to upcoming PLAN aircraft carriers
-Chinese anti submarine warfare capabilities are still widely seen as poor, which would give Beijing pause to issuing a green light for any potential military action that would involve its maritime forces.

The completion of a sale could also have political implications within Taiwan. Unlike the F-16 platform, the diesel sub acquisition by Taiwan would likely  provide thousands of jobs domestically within Taiwan, with many of them being in Southern Taiwan, a traditional political stronghold of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Although unlikely to be finished in such short order,  if such a agreement could be completed,  the KMT government could point to the economic benefits for Taiwan before the 7-in-1 municipal  elections taking place in 2014.

Although the talks between the U.S. and Taiwan have appeared to begun on some level, they are merely informal, as Taiwan appears to be testing the waters for more meaningful discussions regarding its desire to see a modern submarine fleet as part of its naval capabilities. Such a scenario remains a distant prospect, albeit slightly more likely in the future.

DPP showing political maturation during Chairman Su's visit to the United States

(Below are my observations from attending DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang's speech today at The Brookings Institution in Washington DC)
     It is only natural in the aftermath of political defeat for a political party to embark on a "soul-searching" mission,  and reflect on what might have been in a victorious scenario; as well as look towards the future and frame a message that will garner support among its electorate that will push it to a victory in the next round of elections.  Much in the same way that the Republican party looked inward following the defeat of its candidate in 2012, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan has spent the past year and a half searching for an effective platform that will ideally appeal to the electorate of Taiwan, as well as placate international concerns about its position on relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC).

     The week long visit by DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang to the United States has shown in myriad ways that the party is looking to not only learn from its past mistakes, but is striving to further evolve as a political party.    The speech given by Chairman Su at the Brookings Foundation on Thursday gave an insight into the DPP platform heading into Taiwan's "Seven in One" local elections in 2014, followed by the 2016 Presidential election.

     Su began by stating that he sees the DPP evolving into "more than an opposition party", and listed a number of specific policy alternatives from what is currently being offered by the ruling majority  Kuomintang (KMT) party, including a proposed domestic stimulus package, reforms of Taiwan's troubled pension system, opposition to the recent media acquisition controversy, and halting the activation of a 90% completed nuclear power plant in Taiwan amid safety concerns about nuclear power on the earthquake-prone island.

     Regarding the issue of cross-Strait relations, many analysts have pointed to President Ma's strategy of portraying the KMT as the party of stability in respect to its interactions with the PRC since Ma won the Presidency in 2008.  Additionally, many have concluded that 2012 DPP Presidential candidate Tsai  was viewed with suspicion by many government officials in Washington as being someone who would not continue the cross-Strait policies of Ma if elected (although sources who were present at these meetings between Tsai and US officials stated that the officials viewed her with suspicion from the outset of the meetings, and  was not given a fair opportunity to explain her positions regarding Taiwan-China relations with  such officials).

     Chairman Su believed that "after five years of improved ties between Taiwan and China, the pace of agreements between the two will decelerate and soon stall."  Because of this, Su stated his desire to see Taiwan "regain the confidence of its international friends" and looked for Taiwan to actively pursue trade ties in order to better integrate Taiwan into the international economic system.  He also pointed out that with the recent opening of the DDP's China Affairs Council (CAC) on May 9th, the DPP is willing to engage Beijing in order to improve relations.  However, Su did state that he felt the "political and military" differences between the two countries were too wide at the moment to actively engage in negotiations regarding these two issues.  Su also stated that Taiwan was "already a sovereign country with an official title that is the ROC", and that there was no need to change the status quo at this time.

         In the realm of Taiwan's national defense, Su accurately stated that "..democracy and security does not fall from heaven," and that "it is time to demonstrate that we are serious about our national defense," noting that while President Ma's 2008 campaign promise to have defense spending at 3.0% of GDP has never been reached, that under the prior administration defense spending was 2.7% of the annual budget in 2007, and reached 3.0% in 2008.  Su also stated that while Taiwan could not expect to win a war against China, Taiwan could "at least demonstrate determination" and make China "pay a huge price" if it chose to initiate military action towards Taiwan.  This author also agrees with Su's statements that national security should not be politicized, and decisions made  with the nation's security in mind be the paramount deciding factor.

     In conclusion, Su appeared to come to Washington with a clear agenda of talking points that were directed for both domestic and international consumption.  Phrases such as "rebalancing relations with the US", closing "gaps of perception" between the DPP and the United States, and DPP's "soul searching" were repeated often by the Chairman.  Su also looked to placate fears that mistakes made in the previous DPP Presidential administration (under President Chen shui-bian) would not be repeated, in regards to political "surprises" that many felt hindered the Taiwan-US relationship during Chen's tenure as President.  Perhaps the most revealing statement made by Su was that in attempting to become a "more responsible DPP", the party should make decisions that are not always popular with the electorate, but are good for the country.  While it remains to be seen if the DPP will adhere to this bold decision making rationale, it appears that a more mature Democratic Progressive Party is attempting to evolve, and in doing so will give the people of Taiwan a clear choice in choosing their elected leaders, instead of merely having a system in which the DPP plays the role of simple opposition and lacks alternative policies of its own.  In the end, Taiwan's democracy continues to evolve, which bodes well for not only Taiwan, but for the prospects of stability in the region as well.

US Department of Defense 2013 Report to Congress regarding Chinese Military and Security Developments: Analysis

The 2013 DOD Annual Report to Congress is an important tool to not only gain insight into the current modernization of China's military capabilities and doctrine outlooks, but to gain an equally important look into the mindset of the US Department of Defense related to the developments that are taking place in China. Below are excerpts taken from the report with some brief analysis. The report in its entirety can be viewed here.

Chapter 1: Annual Update 

Regarding Sovereignty Claims of the PRC: 
"In September 2012, China began using improperly drawn straight baseline claims around the Senkaku Islands, adding to its network of maritime claims inconsistent with international law"

China has continued to approach its territorial claims in a manner that run counter to international norms.  Its approaches of historical claims, as well as ambiguous markers, such as its nine-dashed line regarding claims in the South China Sea, continue to hinder China's objective of making a "peaceful rise" in terms of international standing.  States such as the Philippines, Vietnam, and Japan have all made military cooperation overtures on various levels towards the United States as a result of such practices.

Current Capabilities of the People's Liberation Army 

*Second Artillery

"By December 2012, the Second Artillery's inventory of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) deployed to units opposite Taiwan stood at more than 1,100" 

"To improve the lethality of this force, the PLA is also introducing new SRBM variants with improved ranges, accuracies, and payloads"

Although  relations between  China and Taiwan have improved on many levels during the Taiwanese Presidential administration  of Ma Ying-jeou, who took office in 2009, China continues to enhance and build up its missile deterrent towards Taiwan.  Many analysts within Washington have stated that enhanced cooperation between the two countries would lower China's aggressive military stance towards Taiwan, the levels in which the PLA  adds missiles pointed at Taiwan has not decreased since 2009.

PLA Navy (PLAN) 

"During 2012, China continued series production of several classes (of guided missile destroyers (DDG) and guided missile frigates (FFG), including construction of a new generation of DDG.  Construction of the LUYANG II-class DDG (Type 052C) continued, with one ship entering service in 2012, and an additional three ships under various stages of construction and sea trials, bringing the total number of ships of this class to six by the end of 2013"

The report also states the launching of the LUYANG III-class DDG (Type 052D) , which is expected to enter service in 2014. The DOD report states that the vessel will be the PLAN's "first multipurpose vertical launch system, likely capable of launching ASCM, land attack cruise missiles (LACM), surface-to-air missiles (SAM), and anti-submarine rockets."

Beijing has taken a rather patient and methodical approach to modernizing its Navy.  Previous suggestions that the PLAN was modernizing its fleet with a traditional  defensive doctrine in mind look to be inaccurate.   As reported by Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes in September, "...having experimented with various DDG designs, the PLAN was simply settling on a model that incorporated the best of each test platform."

PLA Air Force (PLAAF) 

"China bases approximately 500 combat aircraft within unrefueled operational range of Taiwan and has the airfield capacity to expand that number by hundreds.  China continues to field increasingly modern 4th generation aircraft, but the force still consists mistly of older 2nd and 3rd generation aircraft..."

PLAAF J-31 Test Flight 

While the PLAAF continues to modernize its aircraft modernization, it still lacks the numbers of modern aircraft, modern doctrine approaches, and training of their American, Japanese, and Taiwanese counterparts. With the development of the J-20 and J-31, however, the gap in qualitative aircraft capability will continue to shrink in the upcoming years.  Taiwan once enjoyed a highly superior air force over their PLAAF counterparts, yet with the upcoming retirement of its F-4 fighter platform without a viable replacement, the long-term upgrading of its F-16 fleet that will take a sizable portion of its most advanced fighters offline for years at a time, and the expensive maintenance costs of its French-built Mirage fighters, Taiwan faces a dire need for a modern addition to its current Air Force fighter jet arsenal.

China continues to look for options to acquire a long range bomber platform.  It currently utilizes the H-6, which was acquired from the Soviet Tu-16 design in the late 1950s, and has recently upgraded its current fleet. If a new platform was acquired, it would provide additional strategic depth for the PLA's nuclear delivery capabilities.

Part 2 of the Analysis will examine the PLA's objectives of joint training, coordination, and military information operations.

Rumors abound regarding a potential SOFA agreement between the United States and The Maldives

     When most people think of the Maldives, pristine beaches, world-class scuba diving, and its threatened existence due to global warming tend to come to mind.  Yet it is the issue of a rumored and under-the-radar Status of Forces Agreement between the United States and the Maldives that is perhaps thrusting  this small island nation into an increasingly competitive game of risk between regional and world powers.

On April 24th, Maldivian journalist and human rights activist Azra Naseem posted an entry into her blog, Dhivehi Sitee, reporting on a draft agreement that she had seen in which the United States and the Maldives were reportedly close to signing. (the full copy of the draft the Azra Naseem has stated she has seen can be viewed in its entirety here).  If the stated Status of Forces Agreement (referred to hereafter as SOFA) is authentic and were to remain unchanged before both countries were to sign the document, it would entail some of  the following provisions:

*"United States personnel shall be accorded the privileges, exemptions, and immunities equivalent to those accorded to the administrative and technical staff of a diplomatic mission...."
-The document states that "United States personnel" would include members of the United States Armed Forces and civilian employees of the United States Department of Defense.  The document also states that "United States forces" means "...the entity comprising United States personnel and all property, equipment, and materiel of the United States Armed Forces present in the Republic of Maldives". 

*"United States personnel shall be authorized to wear uniforms while performing official duties and to carry arms while on duty if authorized to do so by their orders."

*"Vessels and vehicles operated by or, at the time, exclusively for the United States forces may enter, exit, and move freely within the territory and territorial seas of the Republic of Maldives..."


While SOFA's are not by any means uncommon within the United States Military structure (it currently has over 100 of them; each with varying levels of American autonomy and agreement), what makes a potential SOFA between the United States and the Maldives potentially controversial is the timing, considering the recent political upheaval in the Maldives.  In some aspects, the US approach towards a SOFA with the Maldives appears to be ripped straight out the People's Republic of China's foreign policy playbook.

A Realist Approach 

For decades, Beijing has approaches foreign relations with a certain sense of ambiguity, as it will conduct business with states that have democratic governments and strong positive human rights records (Sweden, France, Denmark, Canada) while jointly pursuing relationships with those states who have authoritarian systems and reputations of rampant human rights abuses (Sudan, Iran, North Korea, Zimbabwe).  With a blanket approach and deep pockets, the PRC has been able to make considerable inroads in geographic areas such as Sub-Saharan Africa, Central America, and the Pacific that have often been considered afterthoughts following the Cold War due to their perceived degraded strategic value.  Unlike the United States, which often attaches human rights and moves towards democratic rule a prerequisite for foreign aid (although there are glaring exceptions to this), China has no qualms about spreading its economic largesse in the name of self interest.

In the fall of 2011, China opened its new embassy in the Maldivian capital of Male, setting off alarms in both Washington and New Delhi.  Speculation was rampant within India that the PRC was looking to further solidify yet another  "friendly maritime ally in the region, following Beijing's enhanced relationships with Sri Lanka, Seychelles, Bangladesh, and Mauritius, and of course Pakistan.  Rumors also surfaced regarding China's desire to establish a naval submarine base on the Maldivian island of Marao.  During the time coinciding with the opening of the new PRC embassy in Male, Beijing also extended a $500 million dollar loan (USD) to the Maldivian government.  Overseeing these developments was Maldivian President Mohamed Nasheed, and the course of events the followed shortly thereafter remains shrouded in dispute.

Mohamed Nasheed 

On February 7th, 2012, President Mohamed Nasheed resigned on national television.  A mere 24 hours later, Nasheed stated that his resignation was coerced by army and police officials, and was threatened with death if he did not comply. His Vice President, Dr. Mohamad Waheed Hassan Manik was sworn in within the hour after the resignation.  The given reasons behind Nasheed's alleged resignation have remained vague.  It should be noted that prior to  Nasheed becoming  the first democratically elected President of the Maldives in thirty years, the country was under over three decades of one-party authoritarian rule.  Nasheed was also arrested and imprisoned multiple times in the 1990s, including one episode in which he claimed he was forced to "eat food mixed with glass".  It seems that an abrupt "resignation" of a Presidency that he fought decades for would not be in his nature.

Since Nasheed's resignation, there have been multiple alleged human rights abuses in the Maldives, as well as the sacking of cabinet officials from Nasheed's Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP).  According the British newspaper The Guardian, 

*"Amnesty International has described events in the Maldives as a "human rights crisis", reporting widespread police brutality and arbitrary arrests"

*"Nearly 2,000 peaceful demonstrators calling for elections have been detained by security forces, many beaten and hospitalised"

A number of celebrities and British government officials have publicly condemned the current situation in the Maldives, including Ed Norton, Sir Richard Branson, and Karen Bilimoria and Eric Avebury of the United Kingdom's House of Lords.

   

Interestingly, the new government has appeared to be more receptive towards American overtures of a military relationship, as shown by a recent joint exercise between American Marines and the Maldivian Navy

(Although joint exercises have taken place previously on a biannual basis,  sources  say that military  contact between the two countries increased shortly after the military coup took place in 2012)

One potential reason behind the relative lack of fanfare of a potential SOFA between the countries is the sensitive political climate that remains in the Maldives.  According to Naseem's post:

"Article 77(3) of the 2008 Maldives Constitution stipulates that:
No part of the territory of the Maldives shall be given to a foreign person or party for a military purpose for any period without the approval of the People's Majlis (Parliament)"

Nasheem also goes on to state that before the SOFA can be sent to Parliament for approval, it must be endorsed by the Attorney General of the Maldives.  Adding to the intrigue, on April 10th, April Azima was "relieved of her Attorney General duties, and transferred to the post of Minister of Gender, Family, and Human Rights".  Nasheem states that the current President Waheed appointed Aishath Bishama, a young appointee who was unlikely to disagree with higher authorities.  From the perspective of the United States, it is understandable that such an agreement would be kept under the radar, as domestic and international human rights advocates and organizations would demand more answers behind such an agreement with a country who has recent questions regarding its human rights record.  With some of  its military stationed in bases throughout the world in countries with questionable human rights records (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Uzbekistan immediately come to mind), why is the United States government looking to establish yet another  military presence in a country that presently is in the midst of a political crisis in the and raise questions about its long stated goal of rewarding democracies and shunning oppressive regimes when possible?  The answer lies in the Maldives increasingly vital  geographic position.

Maldivian government officials being wowed on the carrier USS John C Stennis (3-31-2013) 

Vital Links 
Geography is the primary reason why the United States is looking to outflank China in regards to a military presence on the Maldives, and while doing so largely ignore the human rights questions within the island state.

The Gan Airfield has been strategically important since the Second World War

The Gan airfield  was administered by the United Kingdom as a military facility until 1976, when it handed over control of the Atoll to the Maldives.  It's location in the center of the Indian Ocean potentially allows for patrol aircraft to monitor wide swaths of vital shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean. It could also serve as a base for long range bomber aircraft with proximity to the Middle East and Eastern Africa, as well as a submarine and naval vessel resupply and repair center.   The United States currently leases a base with similar purposes from England on the island of Diego Garcia.  The Diego Garcia base lies nearly 700km to the south of the Addu Atoll, but with America's lease on the island set to expire on 2016, with a deadline on renewal in 2014.  The island is also reputed to be one of America's "black site locations", a location used to interrogate high value captures, often from states targeted in the "War on Terror".


Conclusion: 

The governments of both the United States and the Maldives deny that any SOFA is imminent.  In the past two weeks both countries have issued blanket denials regarding the speculation.  There have not, however, been denials that talks have taken place in recent months.  The aggressive pace in which the United States is pursuing some sort of binding agreement, however, suggests that defense officials in Washington place a high value on having some level of a permanent military  presence within Maldivian territory.  The timing of the ouster of Mohamed Nasheed that coincided with almost immediate engagement between Washington and Male raises further questions.  While China's $500 million dollar loan offer  to the Maldives was an overt attempt by Beijing to curry favor with officials, it is not yet clear what sort of incentive the United States is prepared to offer in return for potential basing rights within the country.  What is clear, however, is that the current Administration is prepared to resort to Beijing's foreign policy blueprint of foreign relations realism, and toss aside the necessity of democracy and human rights if a situation beneficial to the United States strategic position arises.  Hans Morgenthau would be most proud.

What would a Unified Korea look like?: The Costs, Benefits, and Global Ramifications following a reunited Korean State

It would be understandable if the idea of a unified Korean state in the foreseeable future was to be dismissed as an idea of pure fantasy. The leadership of  The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) often speaks about a unified Korean state, albeit one that  would be on their terms.  Although the vast majority of the DPRK citizenry only has the most basic understanding of the world around it, its leadership understands that the idea of a unified Korea under DPRK leadership is one that lost all possibility decades ago, as its economy and military capabilities fell behind its Southern counterpart to a point where it where it no longer could reasonably expect to ever reach a point near-parity with it again.

As for the Republic of Korea (South Korea), its transition from a military dictatorship to democratic rule has coincided with a economic transformation in which it is now home to some of the most widely recognized corporations and manufacturers in the world.  While the ROK government periodically pays lip service to the idea of unification, many of its citizens fear that the costs of doing so will threaten the economic prosperity within South Korea that they have worked so hard to attain.

Yet unlike the current scenario that involves China and Taiwan, the vast majority of Koreans living on the peninsula both desire unification in some form, and for this factor alone raises the possibility of such an event taking place within our lifetime.  Assuming that Korean unification takes place in a relatively peaceful manner, what would it look like? And perhaps more importantly: What would it cost?


Potential Costs of Korean Unification 

One of the difficulties of compiling an accurate cost analysis of such an event is the lack of transparency from Pyongyang regarding its current economic state.  In January, South Korea's Finance Minister stated that the South expected initial costs of unification to be 7% of its current annual gross domestic product (GDP)  every year, for a minimum of ten years.  In 2012, 7% of South Korea's GDP would amount to $1,237 trillion won (1.15T), which amounts to $80.62 billion USD.  This figure tends to be a more conservative estimate on unification costs, as other think tanks and economic analysts tend to place the figure as high as $1.5 trillion over the first ten years.   Although there often is the comparison of Korean unification to the East-West German unification that took place at the end of the Cold War, the lack of infrastructure, industrial capability, and malnourishment within the North Korean state will make reunification in any form an expensive and daunting task. One example of this is the estimated cost that will be necessary simply to "stabilize" vast tracts of the North Korean population initially upon reunification.  Regarding the area of basic food supplies, one South Korean government estimate states the following cost:

In order provide 23 million North Koreans the recommended minimum of 1,600 calories per day for two months, it would require 13,000 tons of grain per day.  In addition, basic medial assistance would be necessary for large portions of the former DPRK population. This cost alone is estimated to be nearly $500 million USD. 

A Korean Unification would face a significantly higher number of obstacles than the East-West German unification following the Cold War. 

Another hurdle facing a new Korean nation is the fact that economic demographics are not on its side.  Where as West Germany had a 5-1 population ratio advantage upon unification with the less developed East Germany, South Korea merely has a 2-1 ratio, which means that it will have to absorb a much larger portion of North Koreans into its demographics, which will place its social services, educational systems, and job retraining services under significant strain.  There is also the issue of "severe division" between both Koreas.  Throughout its separation, East and West Germany minimized repercussions of political division by maintaining trade links, as well as signing over 30 treaties.  One estimate  states an estimate of $1.5 trillion USD over thirty years to simply bring North Korea's GDP to a comparable level to East Germany's GDP gap with West Germany prior to German unification. It will likely take generations before the economic gap is evened between the two Koreas:  The North-South economic gap remains in the United States since the end of its Civil War in 1865, in Italy, residents of Sicily today only have 1/3 the GDP of their counterparts in Milan, and even with its remarkable economic transformation, inland provinces continue to be left behind economically by the coastal provinces, a gap that is expanding annually, not decreasing.

There are also a number of additional areas in which investment must be made in order to successfully integrate Korea into a unified nation that would resemble some level of parity.
                                                                  

 Basic Housing and Living Standards

Medical Services

Massive agricultural investment: Decades of poor agricultural farming methods have left the North Korean countryside littered with soil unsuitable to sustain crops.

Poor economic planning will force any unified Korean government to begin industrial reform within North Korea from nearly ground level.

Integration of the Korean Won: The cost of integrating the North Korean Won into South Korea's economy will be unparalleled in scope.



Benefits of Korean Unification 

Although the costs associated with Korean unification will be unmatched in modern times, the potential benefits that could be achieved by a unified Korean state would almost surely outweigh the costs over time. In a 2009 analysis by Goldman Sachs, its authors stated that a unified Korea had the potential to overtake Japan and Germany's GDP's within 30-40 years.  This statement is plausible due to certain benefits that North Korea would bring to a unified Korea, although it would be decades before the benefits would be fully realized.

Even though South Korea would be integrating nearly 23 million North Koreans who would need large amounts of medical and economic assistance, it would be inheriting a relatively young population, something that would aid in offsetting the South aging population, as well having one of the lowest reproductive rates in the world.  The North Korean population is also relatively well-educated for a country of its current condition, and many of its citizens could contribute relatively quickly within an integrated economy. In terms of size, the territory of a unified Korea would nearly double, and within this land lays a windfall of mineral wealth that could indeed vault Korea past Japan and Germany within 40 years.

There have been estimated of mineral wealth inside North Korea to be of an estimated $6 trillion USD.  Much of this wealth is in the form of rare earth goods that are used in the production of hi-tech goods: a South Korean specialty. The ability for Korea to have these minerals within their borders, as well as potentially moving production factories from China into former North Korean territory where abundant reliable and cheap labor could be found, would accelerate the Korean economy.

A unified Korea would also become less hindered by geographic restraints.  The development of a gas pipeline from Russia to Korea could finally become a reality for further development in Southern Korea.  Land shipments could also begin to China and Russia, significantly cutting transportation costs.  Additionally, the beautiful North Korean landscape could be developed by South Korean tourism industries, allowing for employment opportunities to be had by those living in the North.

With the absence of hostilities between a North and South Korea, large amounts of  economic investment could be diverted from military platforms, and towards domestic investment.  Mandatory military service could likely cease, allowing for millions of Koreans to begin employment years sooner than is allowed currently. 


The costs that a unified Korea will likely have to endure to have such a final outcome, however, will be high.  The RAND Corporation conducted a study in 2009 that recommended that an investment of $62 billion USD be made in order to just double the North Korean GDP within 5-6 years following reunification.  It also gave an estimate of $1.7 trillion USD to have overall parity that would take place decades later.  The costs will be high.  Yet the benefits of a unified Korean state should eventually allow such an event to occur.


Perhaps someday such images as the ones below will become a relic of the past on the Korean Peninsula

1965 Press Conference with ROC Minister of Defense Chiang Ching-Kuo and President Johnson

 Press conference from 1965.  The question about China's nuclear reactors was especially interesting because of today's parallels with a similar issue involving North Korea. Much in the same way that today's North Korea is seen as a "wildcard rogue state", China was in many ways even more rogue in 1965. While today's DPRK is at least partially contained by Beijing's economic leverage, China had no such state in which it deferred to regarding its military ambitions.